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1 Li Huaiyin focuses on Chinese rural society in Huailu County in south-central Hebei
Province, especially on forms of village administration and their relations with state
power in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The work follows a research
path taken since the 1960s and 70s by historians Hsiao Kung-chuan, Ch’ü T’ung-tsu,
Saeki Tomi, and John Watt,1 who concentrated on the organisation and functioning of
village sub-group institutions called lijia, baojia, xiangbao, baozheng, and libao, among
others. These semi-official administrators helped magistrates by collecting taxes and
ensuring social  order.  The works of  Philip  Huang and Prasenjit  Duara in the 1980s
regarding  rural  North  China  updated  this  historiography.2 Huang  scoured  the  rich
archives  in  the  Baodi  sub-prefecture  of  north-eastern  Hebei  and  found  ordinary
villagers who did not belong to the gentry performing the function of xiangbao (rural
administrators). Thus, the configuration of power in rural society appears to have been
more complex than might have been expected. Duara, for his part, characterised the
role of village leaders as a sort of protection brokerage in which they served as go-
betweens in the pre-modern Chinese state, allowing the imperial state to be present in
the countryside without being actually installed there.
2 Li’s work belongs to this line of historiographic revisionism. Having gained access to
the archives of Huailu County, he traces a certain type of rural governance based on the
institution of xiangdi, a sort of village agent or assistant. Unlike the xiangbao in north-
eastern  Hebei,  who  acted  as  an  intermediary  administrator  between  the  local
government  and some 20-odd villages  under  his  jurisdiction,  the  xiangdi  in  Huailu
functioned between the local yamen and his own village. Li thus bases his study on a
micro-history of the village, or so it would seem.
3 In  fact,  the  institution  of  xiangdi  formed  the  relational  interface  between  rural
communities and the administration, since its main function consisted of levying and
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delivering taxes to the state. The archives consulted belonged to the Huailu County
yamen and covered a period from the Guangxu Era until the 1930s. Li identified a total
of 200 villages in the area. Most of them had just one xiangdi, but some had more,
depending on the number of village subdivisions (pai). There were about 500 xiangdi in
all, and this number remained stable throughout the period studied.
4 It is plausible that the xiangdi system was created in the eighteenth century, following
the fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor in 1726, as a means of circumventing the
role of intermediaries and yamen clerks in tax collection. In principle, villagers took
turns performing the xiangdi function, but in practice, the selection process depended
on the traditional social structures of the villages, such as clans (zu) and their branches
(fang), who took it upon themselves to choose a family charged with serving as xiangdi.
Some  villages  rotated  the  title  based  on  a  family’s  landholdings  or  tax  quota,  and
exempted the poorest families from xiangdi service.
5 The concrete  task  of  the  xiangdi  was  to  punctually  collect  taxes  and,  if  necessary,
advance the sums needed for deferred or temporary charges. To fulfil these obligations,
the xiangdi could use the funds of the village community or the clan, or even borrow
from shopkeepers (puhu) or traditional bankers (qianzhuang). They had to then collect
the taxes they had paid in advance on behalf of the villagers, and transfer responsibility
to their successors at the end of the year. The xiangdi role was deemed a public duty to
the community and was not remunerated. On the other hand, the xiangdi enjoyed a
legal status as middleman in local transactions, for which he was allowed to draw a
small  commission.  All  of  the relevant rules –  modalities of  nomination,  duration of
mandate, responsibilities of the xiangdi, villagers’ obligation to repay sums advanced as
taxes on their behalf – were clearly set out in village regulations (cungui, xianggui or
paigui).  These  rules,  considered  to  hold  the  utmost  authority,  were  handed  down
through  generations  and  regulated  interpersonal  relations  well  into  the  1920s  in
Huailu, the author notes.
6 The  status  and  position  of  the  xiangdi  had  the  implicit  backing  of  the  cantonal
administration. Magistrates depended on them to pay taxes in advance, and endorsed
the prerogatives of the xiangdi as set out in village regulations. As Li Huaiyin describes
it, however, even under this efficient cooperative machinery, village communities in
Huailu were far from being an idyllic, harmonious society based on Confucian precepts.
Conflicts broke out over rejection of xiangdi service, the refusal to pay taxes paid in
advance  on  villagers’  behalf,  rivalries  over  the  selection  of  xiangdi,  or  the  use  of
communal funds. The yamen archives from which Li drew much information consisted
mostly  of  administrative  files.  These  showed  that  villagers  appealed  to  the  state
representative  any  time  the  community  or  inter-community  arrangements  proved
insufficient  to  settle  disputes.  Using  this  data,  Li  analyses  the  arguments  of
complainants  and  the  accused,  especially  the  community  norms  to  which  they
routinely referred. These were the principles and regulations of the cungui, which the
villagers  internalised  and  respected  widely,  and  the  magistrates  affirmed  in  their
judgements.  The  village  statutes  were  thus  ratified  by  the  authorities,  acquiring  a
doubly coercive force that governed both the community’s internal life and its rapport
with the external authorities.
7 For state representatives, this institutional flexibility had great merit; the xiangdi who
delivered  up  the  taxes  on  behalf  of  the  population  ensured  close  to  100  percent
compliance in Huailu during the period studied. In view of this, magistrates tended to
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delegate new functions to the xiangdi, such as the task of maintaining order, electing
village chiefs, or setting up and maintaining primary schools. The stable role of the
xiangdi  helped  the  cantonal  council  (xian  canyihui),  composed  of  local  elites,  to
successfully resist tax increases on several occasions during the 1910-1920 period.
8 The author also considers the issue of state penetration into the countryside during the
New Policy (xinzheng) period after 1900 and during the Nationalist era by examining
institutions  introduced  in  Huailu.  Imposed  from  above,  these  were  soon  rendered
ineffective and unreliable, as they lacked financial backing and local participation.
9 Li’s study is measured and rigorous and calls attention to the oft-cited but perhaps
insufficiently stressed notion of China’s great diversity. The work also draws attention
to the extraordinary socio-cultural wealth of the region, and forcefully highlights the
condition that is a sine qua non for building a nation-state, namely the population’s
voluntary participation in the enterprise.
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